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The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Setting the Record Straight on a Financial Disaster Copertina rigida – 7 giugno 2018

4,4 su 5 stelle 136 voti

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The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers was the pivotal event of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Ever since the bankruptcy, there has been heated debate about why the Federal Reserve did not rescue Lehman in the same way it rescued other financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns and AIG. The Fed's leaders from that time, especially former Chairman Ben Bernanke, have strongly asserted that they lacked the legal authority to save Lehman because it did not have adequate collateral for the loan it needed to survive. Based on a meticulous four-year study of the Lehman case, The Fed and Lehman Brothers debunks the official narrative of the crisis. It shows that in reality, the Fed could have rescued Lehman but officials chose not to because of political pressures and because they underestimated the damage that the bankruptcy would do to the economy. The compelling story of the Lehman collapse will interest anyone who cares about what caused the financial crisis, whether the leaders of the Federal Reserve have given accurate accounts of their actions, and how the Fed can prevent future financial disasters.
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Descrizione prodotto

Recensione

'What caused the financial crisis of 2008? Are policymakers ready to handle the next one? These are key questions for anyone interested in economic history and policy. In the past decade, a conventional wisdom has developed about the answers. Yet a new book questions that orthodoxy, offering a more disturbing perspective on the past and a less sanguine prognosis for the future.' The New York Times

'Ten years after the Lehman Brothers collapse, one might think that it's time to end the debate over its causes. Laurence M. Ball, an economics professor at The Johns Hopkins, doesn't agree. He makes a persuasive case that a key lesson remains overlooked: that the Lehman failure and the market crash that followed didn't have to happen and that the political response, the 2010 Dodd-Frank banking law, has made future financial crises more likely, not less … Mr Ball's argument that Dodd-Frank contains the seeds of further politically motivated fiascoes is persuasive - and worrisome.' Wall Street Journal

'Laurence M. Ball has produced a brilliant and riveting study of the most important moment of modern financial history: the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In a remarkably detailed and careful analysis Ball argues that decisions were driven by politics rather than sound policy. In short, this is a must-read masterpiece of financial and historical analysis.' Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University, New York

'Government failure to rescue Lehman Brothers investment bank, and its bankruptcy in September 2008, precipitated a monumental financial crisis. Laurence M. Ball combs through a mass of documents, and presents a new and quite disturbing perspective on the events. Some may disagree with his take, but it is a milestone in the historical analysis of the crisis.' Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University, Massachusetts

'A monumental piece of scholarship that is essential for understanding the financial crisis of 2008 - and the Great Recession that followed. Meticulous, gripping, and compelling.' David Romer, Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy, University of California, Berkeley

'With unprecedented and exciting investigative research, Laurence M. Ball convincingly puts forth an important new view of the financial crisis, uncovering fundamental inconsistencies in the government's often-told story of its role in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the panic of 2008. He shows that the Fed could have legally prevented the bankruptcy, but didn't do so either because of political concerns or a botched implementation of its game plan.' John B. Taylor, Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics, Stanford University

'The official narrative of any crisis is not always the most accurate. Professor Laurence M. Ball's authoritative account of Lehman's demise debunks the Fed's narrative of the calamity and raises uncomfortable questions about the Fed's inconsistent use of its discretionary authority. This captivating book should be required reading for anyone with a stake in preventing the next financial collapse.' Athanasios Orphanides, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

'Ball supports his hypothesis with ample documentation. Whether readers come away convinced that the Fed made a grievous error in not being the lender of last resort to Lehman will probably depend on their view of the Fed. And even if future Fed leaders 'take the Lehman lesson to heart', they may be hamstrung in their actions.' Brenda Jubin, Talk Markets (www.talkmarkets.com)

'Laurence Ball's new book The Fed and Lehman Brothers is an excellent book on the 2008 Financial Crisis … This is a valuable lesson I have learned from Professor Ball's explanation of how the Fed could have saved Lehman. Merely by broadening the types of collateral accepted for cash funding from the Fed and maintaining the functioning of the repo market, the Fed can ensure solvent financial institutions being able to withstand the turbulence of financial crisis.' Seeking Alpha (www.seekingalpha.com)

'The bank that precipitated the [financial] crisis was Lehman Brothers. In The Fed and Lehman Brothers, [Laurence M. Ball], a senior American economics professor, has written an entire book on this episode, based on a careful archival reconstruction of events. His findings are fascinating and significant, and so is his villain: not Lehman Brothers but the Federal Reserve.' Paul Collier, The Times Literary Supplement

Descrizione del libro

This book sets the record straight on why the Federal Reserve failed to rescue Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis.

Dettagli prodotto

  • Editore ‏ : ‎ Cambridge University Press
  • Data di pubblicazione ‏ : ‎ 7 giugno 2018
  • Lingua ‏ : ‎ Inglese
  • Lunghezza stampa ‏ : ‎ 294 pagine
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1108420966
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1108420969
  • Peso articolo ‏ : ‎ 1,05 Kilograms
  • Dimensioni ‏ : ‎ 15.88 x 1.91 x 23.5 cm
  • Parte della serie ‏ : ‎ Studies in Macroeconomic History
  • Recensioni dei clienti:
    4,4 su 5 stelle 136 voti

Informazioni sull'autore

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Laurence M. Ball
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Recensioni clienti

4,4 su 5 stelle
136 valutazioni globali

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Condividi i tuoi pensieri con altri clienti
Un libro essenziale
5 stelle su 5
Un libro essenziale
Non intendo essenziale per quanto riguarda il contenuto ma per il fatto che va per forza inserito nella propria libreria! Questo è l'unico libro che spiega per filo e per segno cosa è accaduto durante quella crisi. Ho iniziato a leggere questo libro sapendo poco sul caso Lehman e continuando a informarmi non ho trovato cose che non fossero già state dette in questo libro. Purtroppo non esiste la traduzione in italiano e il lessico a volte è complicato essendo un libro tecnico ma nulla che non si riesca a superare. Assolutamente consigliato!!!
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Recensioni migliori da Italia

  • Recensito in Italia il 9 novembre 2020
    Formato: Copertina rigidaAcquisto verificato
    Non intendo essenziale per quanto riguarda il contenuto ma per il fatto che va per forza inserito nella propria libreria!

    Questo è l'unico libro che spiega per filo e per segno cosa è accaduto durante quella crisi.
    Ho iniziato a leggere questo libro sapendo poco sul caso Lehman e continuando a informarmi non ho trovato cose che non fossero già state dette in questo libro. Purtroppo non esiste la traduzione in italiano e il lessico a volte è complicato essendo un libro tecnico ma nulla che non si riesca a superare.

    Assolutamente consigliato!!!
    Immagine cliente
    FB
    5,0 su 5 stelle
    Un libro essenziale

    Recensito in Italia il 9 novembre 2020
    Non intendo essenziale per quanto riguarda il contenuto ma per il fatto che va per forza inserito nella propria libreria!

    Questo è l'unico libro che spiega per filo e per segno cosa è accaduto durante quella crisi.
    Ho iniziato a leggere questo libro sapendo poco sul caso Lehman e continuando a informarmi non ho trovato cose che non fossero già state dette in questo libro. Purtroppo non esiste la traduzione in italiano e il lessico a volte è complicato essendo un libro tecnico ma nulla che non si riesca a superare.

    Assolutamente consigliato!!!
    Immagini presenti nella recensione
    Immagine cliente

Le recensioni migliori da altri paesi

Traduci tutte le recensioni in Italiano
  • Amazon Kunde
    5,0 su 5 stelle The Fed and Lehman Brothers
    Recensito in Germania il 10 novembre 2018
    Formato: Copertina rigidaAcquisto verificato
    Grossartig. Eine detaillierte, klare, gut verständliche Analyse, ohne den Versuch zu rechtfertigen.
    Segnala
  • Beto García Neiszer
    5,0 su 5 stelle Great
    Recensito in Messico il 1 giugno 2023
    Formato: Copertina rigidaAcquisto verificato
    A great detailed book, I really enjoyed reading this book as it has a lot of information and details on the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. It recommends to read Lombard Street, consider to get both books.
  • Calvin Dooney
    5,0 su 5 stelle Brilliant insight into Lehman Weekend Sep 14-15 2008.
    Recensito nel Regno Unito il 20 giugno 2019
    Formato: Copertina rigidaAcquisto verificato
    This book has been a real page turner. Great insights into the Chronology and decision making leading up to, during and after Lehman Weekend (Sep 14-15 2008).

    This book lays out the exact laws around what the FED could of done and points out the reasons why the FED officials decided against it.

    Highly recommend this book for anyone’s interested in business, non-fiction, banking and investing books. Is very beneficial for someone who doesn’t have much knowledge on US investment banking legislation.

    Quite an easy read, taking into consideration the complex topic that the book covers. Note that this book does come with a cover as shown in the product pics but I took it off as I don’t like showing what I’m reading on the train.
    Immagine cliente
    Calvin Dooney
    5,0 su 5 stelle
    Brilliant insight into Lehman Weekend Sep 14-15 2008.

    Recensito nel Regno Unito il 20 giugno 2019
    This book has been a real page turner. Great insights into the Chronology and decision making leading up to, during and after Lehman Weekend (Sep 14-15 2008).

    This book lays out the exact laws around what the FED could of done and points out the reasons why the FED officials decided against it.

    Highly recommend this book for anyone’s interested in business, non-fiction, banking and investing books. Is very beneficial for someone who doesn’t have much knowledge on US investment banking legislation.

    Quite an easy read, taking into consideration the complex topic that the book covers. Note that this book does come with a cover as shown in the product pics but I took it off as I don’t like showing what I’m reading on the train.
    Immagini presenti nella recensione
    Immagine clienteImmagine clienteImmagine cliente
  • Hal Jordan
    5,0 su 5 stelle Devastating for Bernanke
    Recensito negli Stati Uniti il 21 giugno 2018
    Formato: Copertina rigidaAcquisto verificato
    Most people see the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank on September 15, 2008 as the event that turned a more or less normal recession into the Great Recession. Why didn't the Federal Reserve loan Lehman the funds that would have allowed the firm to survive long enough to gradually unwind its investments, find another financial firm to sell itself to, or, possibly, even survive long-term as an independent firm?

    Central banks were established to make loans to banks having liquidity problems. Banks are inherently illiquid because they borrow short term and lend long term. With commercial banks, the short-term borrowing mostly takes the form of deposits. Investment banks like Lehman borrowed short term by executing repurchase agreements (repos) with other financial firms. Repos are essentially overnight loans collateralized by securities such as Treasury bills.

    For decades, the Fed had been comfortable in its role of lender of last resort to commercials banks experiencing short-term liquidity problems caused by deposit withdrawals. In March 2008, as the repo market was experiencing problems, the Fed set up the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to also provide liquidity to investment banks. But Fed officials interpreted the Federal Reserve Act as requiring that loans the Fed made through the PDCF have sufficient collateral to make repayment likely.

    So why did Fed Chair Ben Benanke and colleagues allow Lehman to fail rather than make the loans that would have allowed the firm to deal with its liquidity problems? The party line has been that Lehman lacked sufficient collateral, which left the Fed's hands tied. Bernanke has made this point multiple times in the years since 2008; arguing that legally the Fed could not make the loans that would have saved Lehman. He also claims that he was fully aware that the failure of Lehman would be catastrophic for the financial system and the economy.

    Laurence Ball argues -- not to put too fine a point on it -- that Bernanke is lying. Ball marshals considerable evidence to show that Lehman easily had sufficient collateral to back the loans it needed to survive, at least long enough to gradually unwind its investments. He also shows that at that time Fed officials never discussed the possibility that they lacked the legal authority to make the loans. Amazingly enough, Ball also shows that Bernanke was barely involved in the final decision to let Lehman fail. He also argues that neither Bernanke nor other Fed officials realized how big a blow to the financial system Lehman's failure would be, despite their later statements to the contrary.

    In Ball's telling, the decision to let Lehman fail -- actually, to actively push the firm into bankruptcy -- was made by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Legally, it was strictly the Fed's decision whether or not to make the necessary loans. But through force of personality, Paulson took charge of the negotiations and made the key decisions. After the Treasury and Fed had taken action the previous spring to underwrite J.P. Morgan Chase's purchase of the Bear Sterns investment bank -- thereby saving Bear from bankruptcy -- Paulson had come under fierce public criticism. He told Fed officials that he refused to become known as Mr. Bailout by taking action to save Lehman. If Lehman was to survive, other financial firms would have to save it.

    Ball tells an amazing tale, which, if it becomes widely accepted, will deal a heavy blow to Bernanke's reputation. It will be interesting to see if Bernanke, Paulson, or other Fed officials respond. Ball's evidence seems overwhelming, so I have a feeling none of those folks will attempt to dispute his conclusions.

    The book is largely non-technical; Ball explains simply and clearly the financial basics necessary to understand his argument. He writes well and the book is a fast read. If I have one complaint, it's that he doesn't appear to have made much attempt to interview any of the many people he writes about. Nearly his entire argument is based on publicly available documents. He does say that "half a dozen people with first-hand knowledge" spoke to him, but only off the record. Ball is an academic, not a journalist, so perhaps it's unsurprising that he apparently didn't attempt to get a response from the main players.

    Still, that's a nitpick because this is a compelling book. The financial crisis is the most significant economic event in the lives of most Americans. I would think that many readers will want to know the truth behind its key event. I hope this book gains a wide readership.
  • Rams Fan #75
    4,0 su 5 stelle Sad state of affairs
    Recensito negli Stati Uniti il 4 novembre 2019
    Formato: Formato KindleAcquisto verificato
    Well researched book with detailed explanations of all positions. My only complaint is that it is super technical and and as a result a pretty dry read. But if you want a deeper understanding of what went on then this book is it.